Settling Borders for Democracy and Profit by Gibler, Douglas






Douglas Gibler  
Douglas Gibler  
University of Kentucky  
 
"Settling Borders for Democracy and Profit "  
Monday, May 23, 2005 
12:00 p.m.  
Douglas Gibler currently studies territoriality and the effect of 
borders on regime type and state behavior. In doing so, he also 
deals directly with the issue of joint democracy and its effects on 
interstate peace and conflict.  
Gibler pointed out the importance of contiguity and the extent to 
which borders between two states are settled and how it they 
predict peaceful relations between them. A significant portion of 
all militarized disputes occur between contiguous states. In fact, 
nearly 90% of wars that took place between 1815 and 1980 were 
fought between neighbors. Gibler said that among the causes of 
these wars, territorial issues were the most prominent.  
Disputes over territory are the most war-prone of all issues 
because they are likely to be perceived as a zero-sum game by 
the parties involved: one state's gain comes at the expense of 
the other. Therefore, they are often extremely hard to resolve 
without triggering animosity and long-lasting conflict. Gibler said 
that they also provoke certain practices within the states involved 
that are not conducive to democracy or peace; the traditional 
response in such cases is solidification, centralization and 
militarization of the state. As each state proceeds to display its 
resolve and increase its might vis-à-vis the other by allocating 
more resources to its military, an arms race ensues. Peaceful 
relations are less likely to emerge from such competition and 
aggression.  
Engagement in conflict also has an adverse impact on internal 
state policies. Centralization and military buildups threaten the 
prospects of domestic democracy because one single group may 
acquire the means to dominate others. In particular, large 
standing armies built in anticipation of territorial conflict may 
actually promote domination because they impede economic 
development and reduce the number of autonomous social 
groups. Democratization, however, thrives when there is a 
power-sharing arrangement among equals.  
Gibler argued that territorial disputes also tend to lead to 
aggressive bargaining, which foments conflict and makes war 
more likely. In contrast, absence of conflict over territory leads to 
a set of internal state dynamics that are conducive to domestic 
democracy on the one hand and to interstate peace on the other. 
First, stabilized borders eliminate incentives for centralization of 
state and major military build-up. Hence, they do not privilege 
the military/bureaucratic class at the expense of others or 
provide a means for domination by one single group. Instead, 
stable borders pave the way for greater group competition. 
Absence of territorial conflict also brings about greater tolerance 
by the population for the expression of different views, 
particularly of dissident opinions that deviate from the proclaimed 
necessity of engagement in armed struggle. In other words, once 
external threats to the territorial integrity of a given state are 
removed from the state agenda, not only does militarized conflict 
become less likely and peace more likely, but prospects for 
democracy also improve substantially.  
Territorial issues need not lead to war. In fact, resolving 
territorial issues through a territorial settlement treaty has been 
shown to dramatically reduce the probability of war. However, 
alliances to resolve such disputes are difficult to form when 
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borders have been drawn by former colonial powers, separating 
particular ethnic groups or creating noncontiguous states, or 
when there is a significant gap in capability among two states. 
“Young states” that have only recently achieved independence 
are particularly susceptible to engaging in militarized disputes as 
well as suffering democratic breakdowns because they are more 
likely to have outstanding territorial conflicts. Gibler also said 
that alliances tend to form before democracy develops, not vice 
versa. In other words, one cannot claim that joint democracies 
are more likely to enter into alliances and resolve disputes 
peacefully because democracy tends to obtain after stable 
borders are established.  
Gibler's argument, which emphasizes the importance of territorial 
issues for prospects of peace and democracy, sets him apart 
from other scholars who believe in “democratic peace.” Gibler 
argued that it is not their form of government—i.e. democracy —
that makes democratic states less likely to fight each other. 
Democracies do not necessarily resort to peaceful means to 
resolve disputes, either. Rather, stable borders and the 
consequent absence of territorial disputes among these states 
have brought about peaceful interstate relations on the one 
hand, and have been conducive to growth of democracy 
domestically on the other. In other words, democracy in itself is 
not the main cause of peace; rather, both democracy and peace 
are more likely to exist and thrive in the absence of external 
threats.  
Territorial disputes seriously inhibit the chances of development 
of both. Having settled borders is then the main reason 
democratic and peaceful states tend to cluster together in space 
because they are more likely neighbor one another around stable 
international borders. The lack of fear about territorial disputes 
allows a state and a society to enjoy a more stable democracy.  
   
  
Douglas Gibler is Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Kentucky where he teaches 
courses on World Politics, American Foreign Policy, International 
Relations Theory, and the Causes of War.  His research interests 
focus on the causes and consequences of international conflict 
and the international factors that contribute to democratic 
development.   
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